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1.  Introduction
The countries of Sub-Saharan Africa are disproportionately among those receiving the
most foreign aid per capita in the world. In this paper we assess the intensity of aid
flows to African countries, defined as the size of these flows relative to the categories
of economic activity they are designed to support. In the process we provide a critical
overview of standard measures of aid and place the flows currently being received by
African countries in a cross-country and intertemporal perspective. We draw examples
throughout from Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mali, Mozambique, Uganda
and Zambia—seven countries whose aid experience spans that of Sub-Saharan Africa
and will subsequently be the subject of intensive study.
1
Measured relative to recipient GNP, the median value of aid to African
countries now stands at nearly 10 times the amount received by Western Europe under
the Marshall Plan. While a presumption in favor of fundamental effects on welfare
and institutions seems uncontestible, the term “aid intensity” is deliberately neutral.
For most of the paper we steer clear of concepts like “aid effectiveness” and “aid
dependence” that presuppose a behavioral analysis of the aid relationship. While
intensity and effectiveness may be closely related under particular circumstances, the
two are clearly distinct. Burnside and Dollar (1996)), for example, find that when
countries of disparate institutional and policy environments are pooled together, there
is no systematic relationship between the intensity of aid and its effectiveness in
raising the recipient’s economic growth rate. Aid dependence is a murkier concept
that is often directly conflated with aid intensity, as by the World Bank in its annual
World Development Indicators.
2 But this ignores the essentially intertemporal nature
of dependency while implicitly locating dependency in the recipient rather than the
donor. The disparate experiences of countries like Botswana and Uganda bring out a
clear distinction between the level and evolution of aid intensity and suggest that case-
specific features may overwhelm any mechanical link between the two. We return to
these issues at the end of the paper.
The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD is the main
source of comprehensive and internationally comparable data on aid flows. The
DAC’s concept of “official development assistance” (ODA) is widely used in
international comparisons, and we begin in section 1 with an overview of recent
trends in ODA. Section 2 places the ODA measure in a macroeconomic accounting
context and discusses its strengths and weaknesses as a measure of aid receipts. With
caveats in place, we move on in section 3 to study the resource intensity of aid and its
evolution over time. Measuring aid aggregates relative to GNP, population, imports,
investment, and government spending, we compare regional medians and rank the
case study countries relative to the full sample. Five of the seven case study countries,
and by some measures the African median, fall into the upper quartile of aid intensity
in the 1990s, a category we identify as “highly aid intensive.” We then observe that a
country’s aid ratios can be high in an absolute sense but low relative to what would
have been expected given the country’s structural characteristics. We present adjusted
                                                
1 Intensive case studies of these countries are to be carried out as part of the AERC/ODC Collaborative
Research Project on Managing the Transition from Aid Dependence in Sub-Saharan Africa.
2 See the “aid dependency” table in the annual summary volume.2
rankings that control for population and real income per capita, and speculate about
what can be learned from the differences between these and the raw rankings. In
section 4 we make a distinction between the resource intensity of aid flows and their
transactions intensity. This distinction is central to the HIPC Initiative and further
heightens the presumption of high aid intensity in Africa. Section 5 concludes the
paper with a summary of our main findings.
2. Recent trends
Foreign aid has declined since the early 1990s. Relative to donor-country GDP, net
ODA disbursements fell from an average of 0.35 percent in the two decades up to the
early 1990s to a record low of 0.25 percent in 1996. In dollar terms, total net ODA
rose by roughly 14 percent between 1990 and 1996, but this represented a fall of some
8% in real terms. Preliminary figures from the OECD suggest that the full nominal
gain since 1990 was eliminated in 1997.
African countries have more than participated in this overall decline, with net
ODA (to the 45 countries with available data) falling by $2.2 billion, or 24 percent in
real terms, between 1990 and 1996. This followed a very rapid increase throughout
the 1980s, however—much more rapid than that experienced by other regions (Figure
1 gives regional comparisons for countries with populations of 800,000 or more in
1990.
3). Moreover, the African decline was concentrated in Kenya, Somalia, Sudan
and Zaire, where political instability and/or confrontations with donors led to
reductions totaling $2.3 billion. The situation in other African countries is therefore
somewhat less dramatic than suggested by the aggregate figures. Nonetheless, it is
likely that ODA to the region will fall further in real terms, perhaps substantially, over
the next decade. The dominant factors are mainly external to Africa. They include the
continued absence (since the late 1980s) of the traditional strategic and ideological
props to bilateral aid, the cumulative effects of fiscal stringency in the donor
countries, the deepening recession in Japan, and the resource pulls exerted by the
transition economies and the Asian financial crisis. Evidence of low aid effectiveness
in Africa has made its own contribution, in part by reviving arguments about the
negative systemic effects of aid on the recipient. Critics cite the diversion and possible
crowding out of domestic institutional development, the creation of rent-seeking
opportunities, and the undermining of export incentives through real appreciation.
4
Against this background, we ask a simple question: how large and persistent
are aid flows to Africa, relative to those received by other developing countries?
                                                
3 The regional totals exclude ODA allocated by donors to regions but not to individual countries ($945
million for SSA in 1996).
4 On institutional impacts, see Bräughtigam and Botchwey (1998). Azam and Fouda (1998) provide a
survey of macroeconomic impacts. A key unresolved question is whether the systemic effects identified
by aid critics are inherent in large aid flows—as in the view of early aid critics like Bauer and
Friedman—or are the result of an historical aid regime that was dominated by Cold War conflicts (see
van de Walle (1998)).3
3.   Measuring aid flows
Our interest is in the intensity of aid flows from the recipient’s perspective. National
accounting procedures vary widely, however, and are not geared towards a systematic
capture of aid transactions. The DAC data have their own disadvantages—for
example, they cover only a subset of donors and take the perspective of donor cost
rather than economic value transferred—but for cross-country comparisons these are
outweighed by the advantages of consistency and comprehensiveness.
5 We therefore
begin by developing the relationship between DAC measures and an idealized set of
economic accounts of the recipient country.
2.1 The net transfer on aid
Measuring all transactions in a common currency, the following identity applies ex
post to any well-defined economic unit in the recipient country's accounts:
(1) Total spending on goods and services – Total net income, excluding grants and
asset income  =  Net sale of financial assets + Net asset income + Net
grants received.
When applied to the foreign sector, equation (1) is one way of writing the balance of
payments identity. Applied to the domestic sector, it yields the macroeconomic
identity between investment, gross national saving, and the current account. Applied
to government transactions, it yields the public sector's consolidated budget constraint.
We will think of equation (1) as holding on an accruals basis, so that net asset income
and asset sales include contractual obligations even when these are not explicitly
repaid. The net sale of financial assets therefore includes any rescheduling of interest
or change in interest arrears, and grants include cancellation of interest or principal
currently due.
6 The accounting is also at actual transactions prices, implying that grant
income excludes implicit transfers delivered through preferential pricing
arrangements, including preferential interest rates; we return to this in section 2.3.2.
Following World Bank usage (see Appendix 1), we will refer to the right-hand side of
equation (1) as the total “net resource transfer”—net transfer for short—received in
the current period by the sector in question.
An immediately appealing measure of the direct weight of foreign aid for any
economic unit is its contribution to the right-hand side of (1). This is the basis of
"financing gap" analysis as practiced at the World Bank and elsewhere for decades.
7
                                                
5 The DAC data cover in-kind transfers and nearly all financial flows—whether official or private,
concessional or non-concessional—between OECD members, multilateral organizations, and Arab
countries and individual aid recipients (“nearly” all because non-concessional IMF flows are excluded).
6 Note that while the handling of debt restructurings and/or changes in arrears affects gross flows on the
right-hand-side of (1), it does not alter the full right-hand-side.
7 See for example Culagovsky, et al (1991). Traditional "gap" analysis applies ex ante versions of
equation (1) to the domestic sector (saving gap), the foreign sector (foreign exchange gap), and
sometimes the public sector (fiscal gap). Target levels of investment, imports, and/or government
spending are derived in a preliminary step from an overall target for economic growth. Given
projections for domestic saving, exports (plus non-aid financing) and/or government revenue (plus non-
aid financing), the role of aid is to fill the most binding gap, bridging the largest ex ante shortfall4
Here we apply this logic to the foreign sector in order to generate a measure that
approximates the widely-used DAC concept of Net ODA. Applying (1) to
international transactions, we first separate grants into private and official. We then
divide total net transfers into those received from official creditors—governments and
multilateral institutions—and those received from private creditors. A separate line
captures non-debt-creating flows. Finally, we identify as concessional all debt claims
with an original grant element (see Appendix 1) of 25 percent or more. Measuring
flows in US dollars, equation (1) becomes
(2) Trade deficit on goods, services and non-asset income – Net private grants
=  Net official grants
+ Net transfer on concessional debt from official creditors
+ Net transfer on non-concessional debt from official creditors
+ Net transfer on debt from private creditors
+ Net transfer on non-debt assets
=  Net transfer on aid
+ Net transfer on non-concessional debt from official creditors
+ Net transfer on debt from private creditors
+ Net transfer on non-debt assets.
On the financing side of equation (2), we have combined official grants with net
transfers on concessional debt to obtain what we call the net transfer on aid. It is a
short step from this concept to net ODA.
2.2 Net ODA à la DAC
“Net ODA” is defined in DAC data as the sum of grants and net concessional loan
disbursements for development purposes (see Appendix 1). While related to our
concept, net ODA differs in three main respects:
• Net ODA includes free-standing technical cooperation (TC) grants. Such grants
(which exclude those tied to implementation of aid-financed investment projects)
are large: as indicated in Table 1 they make up a quarter of Net ODA to African
countries and 35 percent of aid to non-African countries in the 1990s.
8 It is
generally thought, however, that much of free-standing TC represents payments to
                                                                                                                                           
between targeted and projected spending. To derive the saving gap from (1), for example, replace
"current non-asset, non-transfer income" with the appropriate concept for the domestic sector, which is
GDP. Then subtract current spending C+G from GDP and plug in targeted and projected quantities to
get
Required Net External Financing = Targeted Investment - Projected Gross Domestic Saving.
Equation (1), of course, is an identity. It holds ex post regardless of whether the behavioral assumptions
underlying gap are valid (for a critical view, see Easterly (1997)).
8 Figures refer to regional median values of decadal averages for individual countries. Since our focus is
on individual country experience, we avoid the use of aggregates weighted by the size of countries. We
use medians rather than means in order to reduce the sensitivity of comparisons to outliers.5
donor-country nationals for services delivered to donor agencies rather than
recipient countries. Since these do not enter the accounts of the recipient, we
exclude such grants when calculating gap-inspired measures of aid intensity. In
section 4, however, we use the ratio of TC grants to government spending on
wages and salaries as one indicator of the intensity of donor inputs into domestic
policy management.
• Net ODA refers only to grants and net disbursements and therefore excludes
interest payments. The result is an overestimate of the net transfer on aid by the
amount of interest paid, rescheduled or cancelled on ODA loans (the latter two
arrangements leave the net transfer on aid unchanged in equation (2), since an
imputed interest repayment is exactly offset by a new disbursement or imputed
grant; but measured net ODA would rise). Table 2 uses World Bank data for a
subset of DAC recipients to get rough orders of magnitude.
9 For SSA, net interest
payments tend to be roughly 10 percent of concessional net disbursements. This
share has risen over time, however, so that the increase in median net transfers on
Africa’s concessional debt between the 1970s and 1990s—a concept close to the
net transfer on aid but including non-developmental concessional loans and
excluding grants—is less than a quarter of the increase in median net loan
disbursements. Outside of SSA, interest payments have been much larger, both in
per-capita terms and relative to net loan disbursements, and have grown even
faster over time. The omission of net interest therefore produces an overstatement
of net transfers to all aid recipients, and a more dramatic overstatement in the
1990s than earlier. Since the required adjustment is smaller for African countries,
there is some tendency in the ODA data to overstate the both the relative level and
the relative increase in net transfers to African countries.
• Net ODA excludes concessional finance that is non-developmental in purpose
(e.g., military aid) or that is received from non-DAC, non-Arab donors (e.g.,
China or the former Soviet Union). Since the World Bank data are classified by
concessionality alone and purport to cover all creditors rather than just DAC and
Arab-country donors (see Appendix 2), we can get some sense of the effect of this
exclusion comparing the first two columns of Table 2. For SSA, the DAC measure
of Net ODA disbursements exceeds net concessional disbursements calculated
using World Bank data. The opposite is true for other developing countries until
the 1990s. This difference suggests that concessional net disbursements excluded
from Net ODA have been larger for African countries than others.
2.3  ODA and resource transfers
Before leaving equation (2) we note two further caveats in the interpretation of Net
ODA. First, higher aid need not be associated with a larger overall net transfer from
creditors. As suggested by the previous discussion, aid can and does finance debt
service. Second, the DAC measure aggregates grants and loans and excludes the
transfers implicit in trade preferences. A more thorough use of the logic of “grant
                                                
9 World Bank data are available for 75 of the 95 “large” countries (populations exceeding 800,000 in
1990) in the DAC sample. The World Bank data come from the Debtor Reporting System and do not
distinguish concessional official debt by purpose.6
equivalents” would put the calculation of transfers on a sounder economic footing and
could produce major changes in measured aid flows. We discuss these caveats in turn.
2.3.1 Aid in total net transfers
From an accounting perspective, aid can as easily finance net transfers to other
creditors on the right-hand-side of equation (2) as net imports of goods and services.
Automatically included in this category is any debt restructuring that converts non-
concessional or non-developmental loans, whether from private or official creditors,
to ODA loans. Also included is the use of ODA flows to repay senior,
nonconcessional official loans such as IMF or IBRD credits. More generally, of
course, any use of fungible aid flows to increase debt service will mean an offset
elsewhere in net transfers. The “financing gap” logic in equation (2) is misleading in
this respect, as it implicitly assumes a counterfactual in which other net transfers—
including debt service on non-ODA debt—are predetermined with respect to aid
flows.
10 Devarajan, Rajkumar, and Swaroop (1998) provides econometric evidence of
the use of ODA disbursements for debt service.
Table 3 uses World Bank data to examine the relationship between the net
transfer on aid and successively more inclusive measures of net transfers on the right-
hand side of equation (2). For comparison purposes, column 1 shows the DAC
measure of Net ODA (excluding TC). As discussed above, this is close to the net
transfer on aid—approximated in column 2 by the net transfer on concessional debt
and grants—but exceeds it by the 1990s, reflecting the omission of interest payments.
Starting in column 2 and reading to the right, we find that the rapid increases in aid to
SSA between the 1970s and 1990s were accompanied by declines in all other
categories of net transfer. The offset is striking: even within official flows, net
transfers to nonconcessional official creditors “eliminate” eighty percent of the
increase in net concessional transfers.
11 Outside SSA, the reduction in net transfers on
                                                
10 From the perspective of financing gaps, of course, what matters is the contribution of aid flows to
total net transfers relative to a reasonable counterfactual. Constructing the counterfactual is difficult,
but the central question is clear: to what degree would the aid recipient have reduced net imports in
order to service non-aid financial obligations, if aid had been smaller? At one extreme, such obligations
would have been fully honored, in which case Net ODA accurately captures the increase in net total
transfers relative to the counterfactual. At the other extreme, the borrower would have accumulated
additional arrears in the amount of reduced aid. In this case, the net transfer is received by other
creditors rather than by the aid recipient, with no impact on the right-hand side of (2) relative to the
counterfactual.
11 A similar table could be produced using only DAC data, since these data cover non-ODA financial
flows as well as ODA flows. As discussed earlier, however, the World Bank data have the advantage of
including net interest (and profit remittances in the case of aggregate net transfers). A second advantage
is that the DAC data exclude nonconcessional IMF flows. Since these claims are being repaid on net in
the 1990s, the DAC data give an overinflated impression of the growth in net official transfers. An
extreme example is Zambia. In 1995, the IMF converted well over $2 billion in (mainly overdue) debt
service on nonconcessional IMF loans into a concessional loan, in a transaction that itself produced a
net official transfer of zero. The concessional part of the transaction is properly reflected in both the
DAC data and the World Bank data, with the result that Net ODA (DAC) and net transfers on
concessional debt (WB) are above $2 billion for 1995. But the associated repurchase (= repayment) of
nonconcessional IMF is not recorded in the DAC data, which therefore show “total receipts, net” (the
widest DAC measure, covering official and private flows from all DAC sources) of over $2 billion. In
Table 4, this shows up in the large disparity between net ODA and net official transfers for the 1990s.7
non-concessional debt and grants is even greater, and there is no increase in Net ODA.
Aggregate net transfers fall over time, rescued only partially by a dramatic increase in
non-debt-creating flows in the 1990s. For African countries, the stability of net official
transfers at the median suggests a picture in which ex ante loan obligations to official
creditors are either rolled over into higher debt or converted ex post into grants.
2.3.2  Aid as a generalized grant equivalent
The aid measures we have been discussing aggregate grants with concessional loans,
even though these transactions have very different net discounted value to the
recipient. They also ignore any grant element in non-developmental or non-
concessional financial transactions with donors. Finally, they ignore any transfers
implicit in trade preferences or non-market pricing of aid-financed imports. A natural
(though currently impractical) way to address these drawbacks is to calculate aid as
the present value of the net contribution to the recipient’s resources of all current
transactions with donor entities. A transaction would qualify as aid if and only if it
shifted out the recipient’s intertemporal budget constraint, and in precisely the amount
of the shift. In Appendix 2 we call this measure the ex ante grant equivalent of current
transactions. Here we briefly consider what impact this concept has on interpreting
Net ODA.
Consider first the DAC practice of aggregating concessional loans with grants.
From the perspective of tracking ex ante grant equivalents over time, the
appropriateness of this depends on whether repayment is anticipated at the time loans
are made. Since a loan is an ex ante grant only if repayment is never anticipated, the
DAC practice embodies an implicit counterfactual of non-repayment. If repayment is
the appropriate counterfactual, then aggregating loans with grants overestimates aid at
the time a loan is made and underestimates it as repayments arrive. Over time, of
course, the ex post grant equivalent of any set of debt transactions gradually reveals
itself in the discounted sum of actual and imputed net cash flows—and this ex post
measure is robust to the counterfactuals used to classify year-to-year flows.
12 The lack
of a convincing set of country-specific counterfactuals therefore provides a strong
reason for using long time averages of Net ODA when making cross-country
comparisons.
Consider next the practice of ignoring any grant element in non-developmental
or non-concessional financial transactions with donors. For a country that is credit-
rationed in international financial  markets, even a “non-concessional” official loan
carries an ex ante grant element. This is true even if repayment is anticipated, since
the recipient obtains the current inflow at lower cost in terms of future outflows than
could be obtained either on the private international market—where rationing has
prevented further borrowing—or via a reduction in domestic investment. This portion
                                                
12 The ex post grant equivalent of a set of debt transactions over a given span of time can be
approximated by the discounted sum of Net ODA flows over the period in question (again with the
caveat that interest should be included), minus the change in discounted debt obligations between the
beginning and end of the period. If the change in discounted debt stocks is small, then looking at long
enough time averages of Net ODA provides an obvious way of reducing the arbitrariness in classifying
year-to-year flows. The need to specify a counterfactual never really disappears, of course, since some
assumption must be made about whether contractual obligations remaining at the end of the period are
real or notional.8
of the grant equivalent of current transactions is missed by Net ODA. The
underestimate is larger if new nonconcessional loans are not expected to be repaid.
Table 3 gives some indication (in the difference between columns 3 and 2) of the
evolution of non-concessional net official transfers for African and non-African
countries. Both groups show a pattern at the median of net inflows in the 1970s and
net outflows in the 1980s  and 1990s. Initial flows are larger and subsequent
repayments smaller for African countries, however, suggesting greater continued
recourse to nonconcessional official finance, whether in the form of rollovers or new
loans. Incorporating the grant equivalent of these transactions would therefore tend to
increase measured aid to African countries by more than to other developing
countries.
A final implication of shifting to grant equivalents would be to incorporate
resources transferred via trade transactions. Trade preferences received by African
countries under the Lomé Convention and other arrangements increase the prices
received by African exporters above those that would otherwise prevail. The grant
equivalent of these preferences can be approximated by the price differential
multiplied by the volume of exports in the affected categories. The implied grant
equivalent may be large. Kennan and Stevens (1998), for example, estimate the annual
value of Lomé preferences for a subset of ACP states whose status may change with
the expiry of Lomé IV in 2000. The calculated value of nearly 800 million ECU
amounts to over 40 percent of the aid given by the European Development Fund to all
ACP countries in 1994.
13 Our own back-of-the envelope calculation for Mauritius
suggests that garment and textile preferences in European and U.S. markets alone
(under Lomé and other arrangements) may be worth 1.5 percent of GDP on an annual
basis.
14
An implicit transfer goes in the opposite direction if imports financed by tied
aid carry above-market prices. In such cases a portion of the aid represents a transfer
back to donors (in the end, this is a transfer within the donor country, from general
budget to exporters). This portion—again approximated by the price differential
multiplied by the volume of affected imports—should be subtracted when calculating
the grant equivalent of the aid flow to the African recipient. As with trade preferences,
the implied adjustment may be large in some cases. Osei (1998), for example, finds
that in Ghana in 1990-95, the unit values of aid-financed imports in a given 5-digit
SITC code are often more than 4 times higher than the unit values of non-aid imports
in the same category and year. While much of this differential may be attributable to
quality differentials and the bundling of export credit into trade transactions, the
possibility of a substantial reverse transfer to donors is strong. Yeats (1990) uses a
                                                
13 The calculation applies to countries not classified as least developed. The EC Commission has
proposed that these countries lose their Lomé preferences when Lomé IV expires in February 2000. 800
million ECU is the loss of revenue these countries would have suffered on their 1994 exports of
protected commodities if these exports had faced tariffs specified in the Generalized System of
Preferences rather than in Lomé IV. Two-thirds of this loss is generated by the loss of sugar
preferences.
14 Garment and textile exports from Mauritius get duty-free access to EEC markets via the Lomé
Convention and face relatively generous textile quotas in the US market. Exports from the Export
Processing Zone are roughly 15% of GDP and 95 percent go to these two markets. A 10 percent
preference margin would therefore be equivalent to roughly 1.5% of GDP on a flow basis, equivalent to
Mauritius’ average net ODA receipts in the 1990s.9
large cross-country sample and controls for quality by focusing on the pricing of iron
and steel imports from the same source. He finds that 20 West African countries that
were formerly French colonies paid an average 20-30 percent more for iron and steel
imports from France than did other developing countries. Similar premia prevailed on
the iron and steel exports of Belgium, Britain and Portugal to their former African
colonies. If these findings are attributable in important degree to overpricing of aid-
financed imports, the implication is that (other things equal) Net ODA numbers
overstate the aid received by African countries relative to other developing countries.
2.4  Summing up
We have identified three main weaknesses in the DAC data. These data exclude
interest payments; they aggregate grants and loans; and they ignore the transfers
implicit in trade preferences or aid tying. With the exception of the aid tying effect,
the net result of these shortcomings is probably to underestimate the concessional
resource transfer received by African countries relative to that received by other
developing countries. To the degree that this is true, rankings based on time averages
of the unadjusted data—which already tend to place African countries near the top—
may be relatively robust to these shortcomings.
15 We now turn to these rankings.
3. The resource intensity of aid
In this section and the next we present alternative measures of the intensity of aid
flows to African countries, in cross-regional perspective. We start in this section with
the resource intensity of aid, looking at the standard set of gap-inspired measures in
the 1990s. We then focus on the aid-to-GNP ratio, where the data allow a comparison
both across regions and over time. Finally we re-examine aid-to-GNP rankings after
controlling for real income and population. In section 4 we use debt transactions to
examine the transactions intensity of aid.
3.1 Gap-inspired measures
Table 4 presents a full set of traditional aid-intensity indicators for the period 1990-95.
Columns 3, 4 and 5 correspond to the three financing gaps of traditional aid analysis,
measuring the “contribution” of aid flows to imports, domestic investment, and
government spending. Technical cooperation grants are excluded. Africa’s relative
position in these tables is consistent with the overall aid-to-GNP measure given in
column 2 (inclusive of TC): for each measure, the African median is near or above the
75
th percentile for the full sample. The comparison is most striking with government
spending and gross investment, where the median African country receives aid equal
to 50 and 71 percent, respectively, of these spending categories. Rank correlations are
high and statistically significant between any two of these measures. The central
                                                
15 This is not to claim that adjusting for these features might not alter individual rankings substantially,
particularly in year-to-year data. Moreover, we have avoided discussing the relationship between these
data and measures of aid drawn from the macroeconomic accounts of individual countries. Large
differences are common, not only between donor-based and national sources but also across alternative
national sources. These differences are often difficult to reconcile even with detailed country-specific
study.10
message is clear: when aid is measured relative to GNP or its spending sub-
aggregates, African countries tend to cluster in the upper quartile of the aid intensity
rankings.
16
Column 1 shows real aid per capita. For a given aid-to-GNP ratio, real aid per
capita is an increasing function of real income per capita.
17 Since real incomes vary
widely in the sample and tend to be negatively correlated with aid-to-GNP ratios
(holding population constant; see the next section), the rankings for individual
countries can differ substantially substantially from the rankings by GNP or its
components. Botswana and Uganda provide clear illustrations. The former’s high real
income implies that large real aid flows per capita—at the 89
th percentile of the full
sample—are required to deliver an aid-to-GNP ratio at the 46
th percentile. For
Uganda, aid flows look much larger when measured relative to GNP (83
rd percentile)
than when measured in real terms per capita (53
rd percentile), reflecting very low real
income per capita.
The final column of Table 4 shows the ratio of technical cooperation grants to
government spending on wages and salaries. By this measure, the relative contribution
of foreign-financed as opposed to domestic government expertise in policy
development is large in Africa. This is true even though TC grants are relatively low
as a share of total grants in SSA, and though their share in total Net ODA has fallen
over time while rising elsewhere (Table 1).
3.2 Aid intensity over time
Table 5 examines changes in aid intensity over time. Column 1 shows the ratio of Net
ODA (including TC grants) to GNP for 1970-79, 1980-89, and 1990-96. We also
show the ratio of net official transfers to GNP, for comparison purposes; as discussed
earlier, this includes nonconcessional official transactions and net interest, and
excludes TC grants. The remaining columns show the position of the seven African
case study countries, both in absolute terms and relative to the available sample, for
each measure.
The data in Table 5 bring out a distinction between the level of aid flows and
their change over time. Africa’s median aid was already high by historical standards in
the 1970s, but it nonetheless doubled over the next two decades. The increase is even
faster relative to GNP than in real dollar terms per capita (cf. Table 1), the difference
being attributable to stagnating real per-capita incomes in the 1970s and 80s and
sustained real exchange rate depreciation beginning in the early 1980s.
18 African aid
ratios in the 1990s are therefore high not only in cross-regional perspective, but also
relative to historical experience. The differences suggested by Table 5 are statistically
                                                
16 One way of summarizing the close correlation across gap-inspired measures is that the cross-country
variation in aid-to-GNP ratios apparently dominates the cross-country variation in the ratios of imports,
investment, or government spending to GNP.
17 If A is aid in dollars, P is a dollar price index, Y is real GNP, and N is population, then real aid per
capita (column 1 in Table T9) is (A/P)/N, and the aid-to-GNP ratio (column 2) is A/PY. The two
measures are related by (A/P)/N = (A/PY)*(Y/N), where Y/N is real income per capita.
18 Real depreciation began in earnest in the mid-1980s outside of the CFA zone, and in many cases
(including the CFA countries in 1994) it continued to depress nominal-dollar GNP figures through the
1990s.11
significant.
19 In striking contrast to the African experience is that of the High-
Performing Asian economies (HPAEs). Already small in the 1970s, aid to these
countries essentially fell to zero.
Columns 4 and 6 give percentile ranks for the seven African case study
countries. These are robust to the measure of aggregate aid: in no case does the rank
differ by more than 10 percentage points. When we control for sample (using only the
75 countries for which both measures are available), the rank correlation between the
two measures is high and statistically significant. The case study countries show a
dispersion of patterns, against a background of high average levels. Botswana’s
“graduation” out-does that of the HPAEs, with aid falling from nearly 20 percent of
GDP to just over 3 percent. This experience is unique in SSA: Mauritius is the only
other large country in SSA in which aid fell relative to GDP between the 70s and
90s.
20 Moreover, even after graduation, Botswana’s aid is higher than the roughly 2.5
percent of GDP received from the U.S. by Western Europe under the Marshall Plan,
and nearly half of that received by Korea before the reduction of US aid in the early
1960s.
21 Mozambique, Uganda and Zambia are at the other extreme: aid is initially
low but rises very rapidly over time. Burkina Faso and Mali are intermediate cases
that reflect the African median, with aid initially high but rises further over time.
Figure 2 plots aid-to-GNP ratios and percentile ranks for the 1970s and 1990s
for the countries covered in Table T4. The full distributions of country averages are
given outside the border, with horizontal and vertical lines within the border
indicating quartiles of these distributions. Inside the box the Sub-Saharan African
countries are identified with “+” and the case study countries are highlighted (Table
10 provides data and rankings for all countries with data available for the 1990s). Aid
intensity declined between the two periods only in Botswana and Mauritius. By the
1990s these two, plus Gabon and Nigeria, were the only African countries with aid
intensity below the median for the full sample. The most common situation for
African countries was to begin in the high-intensity upper quartile and to remain there.
Of the remaining countries only Laos shares this feature.
                                                
19 To assess statistical significance, we regressed country/decade ratios underlying columns 1 and 2 of
Table T4 on dummy variables for region and decade. We excluded SSA in the 1990s from the list of
dummies in order to interpret the coefficients on other dummy variables as differences in
country/decade means relative to SSA in the 1990s. All point estimates were negative for both
measures, and with the exception of those involving the Pacific region, these differences in  mean were
statistically significant at the 5% level or better.
20 Net ODA to Mauritius was 3.6, 3.5, and 1.5 percent of GNP in the 70s, 80s and 90s, respectively.
Botswana therefore remains unique in the initial size of aid and the rapidity of its graduation.
21 Marshall Plan aid from the United States totaled roughly $13 billion between 1948 and 1952;
aggregate GNP in Western Europe was on the order of $120 billion at the outset of the plan, and rose
rapidly (United States Information Agency, “The Marshall Plan – Partners in Peace,” Error!
Bookmark not defined.. By these measures Western Europe received roughly 10 percent of GDP over
four years. In the DAC data, net ODA to Korea averages 8.5% of GNP in the 1960-63 period, after
which aid falls rapidly.12
3.3 Adjusting for income and population
Rich and populous developing countries tend systematically receive less aid relative to
GNP than poorer, less populous countries. To what degree can Africa’s high aid
intensity be “attributed” to relatively small populations and low real incomes? Table 6
uses panel regressions to describes the distribution of the aid-to-GNP ratio conditional
on lagged population and real income per capita, using panel regressions.
Observations are 5-year (“halfdecade”) averages for 87 individual countries, with real
income per capita measured in 1985 PPP-adjusted dollars.
22 We allow for fixed time
effects in order to control for a range of time-specific factors that may have influenced
aid ratios. For the full sample (column 2), the elasticities of the aid-to-GNP ratio with
respect to population and real GNP per capita (calculated at the sample means) are
substantial at –0.35 and –0.88.
Columns 2 - 5 of Table 7 summarize the difference between actual aid-to-GNP
ratios and the values predicted on the basis of the right-hand-side variables. Aid to
Africa tends, not surprisingly, to be underpredicted by these regressions. More
strikingly, aid-to-GNP ratios have tended to grow more rapidly over time than
predicted among African countries, while the reverse is true for other developing
countries. Africa’s increase is (not surprisingly) larger in comparison to a norm based
only on the non-African sample: in column 3, Africa’s aid ratio is predicted to
increase by only 2.5 percentage points between the 1970s and 1990s, compared to an
actual increase (column 1) of 12.5 percentage points. Similar results (not shown) hold
when we use real aid per capita rather than the aid-to-GNP ratio as the dependent
variable.
These results suggest that a substantial portion of regional differences,
particularly with respect to changes in aid intensity, are not readily attributable to
underlying structural changes as reflected in population growth and real income. At
the individual country level, the results conveyed by this exercise can be revealing.
The three CFA countries in Table 7 receive more aid than expected, whether in the
full sample or when SSA is excluded; this is consistent with the “friends of France”
effect emphasized by Boone (1994), who found similar a similar effect for friends of
the U.S.A. and friends of OPEC. Botswana’s graduation is undoubtedly driven in part
by rapid real income growth, which helps to move it from the 90
th to the 67
th
percentile of predicted aid levels; but its actual movement is much further than
expected, from the 96
th to the 45
th percentile. The rapid increase in aid received by
Mozambique is roughly split between increases “explainable” by the right-hand-side
variables and increases apparently associated with other factors. Structural features
have very little apparent association, in contrast, with Uganda’s rapid increase in aid.
A full accounting of these findings would require a structural model of aid
determination, embodying both political factors and persistent economic shocks. Even
in the absence of such a model, however, large country-specific divergences in Table
9 suggest the importance of case-specific factors, including the resolution of war or
                                                
22 The sample is restricted to “large” countries (those with population of at least 800,000 in 1990). We
include all halfdecade observations for which a country has at least 3 annual observations on all
variables. The last halfdecade, 1990-95, includes 6 rather than 5 years.13
civil strife, major terms of trade losses or persistent droughts, or changing relations
with key donors.
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4.  Debt restructuring and the transactions intensity of aid
The measures we have considered so far focus on net resource transfers from donors.
A given net transfer, however, is consistent with a wide variety of underlying
transactions. In this section we make a distinction between the resource intensity of
aid flows and their transactions intensity. Debt restructurings provide an important
example. Consider a country with debt difficulties that nonetheless receives $100
million a year in net transfers from creditors over the period of a decade. One way in
which this could be accomplished is through debt stock cancellation at the outset of
the decade, followed by $100 million a year in grants. The same ex post grant
equivalent could be delivered, however, through a sequence of reschedulings, outright
grants, partial cancellations of new debt service due, and arrears accumulation,
culminating in a large writeoff of remaining debt at the end of the decade. A central
argument of the debt overhang literature is that the latter arrangement is more costly to
the borrower, even though the ex post discounted net transfer is identical.
Tables 8 and 9 suggest that the transactions intensity of Africa’s external debt
problem is high in cross-regional perspective. Africa’s experience with debt
restructuring appears in the first column of Table 8. In contrast with Latin America,
Africa’s debt restructurings have been mainly official (though involving both official
and private debt). These have buttressed net resource transfers upwards relative to a
counterfactual of repayment. But the stock of debt, particularly to official creditors,
has tended to grow rapidly. Africa’s debt in the 1990s is therefore very large relative
to exports (column 2). Column 3 shows the “grant element” of the external debt,
calculated as the difference between its face value and the discounted value of
repayment obligations; Africa’s debt is large even after accounting for its contractual
concessionality.
24  Debt service due is correspondingly high by cross-regional
standards (column 4), and even more so if we include the stock of arrears (column 5).
The result is that many African countries continue to pay only a fraction of
debt service newly due each period. Of the remainder (Table 9), part is officially
rescheduled or cancelled and the rest is added to arrears. None of the latter
transactions affects net flows—and in an extreme interpretation, the intermittent Paris
Club reschedulings, annual consultative group meetings, and constant dealings with
bilateral and multilateral donors that underlie these flows simply represent a
formalization of concessions already received. Non-repayment is fully anticipated, all
bargaining with donors is window-dressing, and net flows—revealed ex post but
known in advance to participants—capture all that matters. The debt overhang
                                                
23 The degree to which exogenous external shocks play a role is a topic for future research. Rodrik
(1997) finds that lagged terms of trade changes are statistically insignificant in similar panel
regressions; but there is no reason this variable cannot be entered contemporaneously. Note also that
persistent real exchange rate movements can exert a strong effect on aid-to-GNP ratios.
24 The discount rates in the Bank's calculation are currency-specific interest rates on officially-
supported OECD export credits. These represent, according to the Bank, "on average, the most
favorable terms of fixed-rate, non-concessional debt developing countries are able to contract in the
international loan market." (World Bank 1992, p.127)14
literature suggests, however, that the transactions that underlie net flows create an
economic impact that is separate from the net flow. The arguments are familiar (e.g.,
Agénor and Montiel 1996, chapter 14). The process of debt restructuring is
bureaucratically costly. It creates uncertainty about the status of upcoming debt
service claims and the timing and amount of concessions. It creates a presumption that
rapid export growth will lead to reduced official flows, thereby placing a tax on the
private investment and policy reform needed to achieve this success. It enhances the
leverage perceived by donors—whether realistically or not—and therefore their
willingness to interfere in the recipient’s policy formation. Finally, the existence of
senior official claims may discourage private lending. For these reasons observers
have increasingly called for a shift from reschedulings to outright cancellation of debt
service (although neither of these alters the net transfer), and, most recently in the
HIPC Initiative, for a shift from repeated flow restructurings to debt stock
cancellation.
5. Conclusions
Aid to African countries is declining, but from historically unprecedented levels.
Standard measures of the resource intensity of aid are highly correlated across
countries in the 1990s and roughly half of African countries and five of the seven case
study countries land in the “high intensity” upper quartile of the overall distribution of
aid. We have reviewed the DAC data and the concept of foreign assistance, and
argued that while more sophisticated measures of aid may have non-trivial impacts in
individual cases, Africa’s overall position in world rankings is likely to be robust to
adjustments.
Closely allied to resource intensity, but conceptually distinct, is the
transactions intensity of aid or of relations with official donors more generally.
Africa’s interface with world financial markets is overwhelmingly with official rather
than private creditors. We decomposed debt service due and found that although
Africa’s external debt has a median grant element nearly twice that of the typical
developing country, African countries tend to pay by far the smallest share of what is
due (including arrears). Reschedulings and flow cancellation accounted for nearly
thirty percent of debt service newly due between 1990 and 1995; but even these
arrangements did not prevent nearly 15 percent of new obligations being rolled into
arrears each year. With net concessional transfers exceeding net official transfers and
both measures remaining large and positive in most cases, the picture is one in which
debts obligations are being converted to grants ex post. This process is one with high
transactions intensity relative to outright cancellation of debt stock.
What is the relationship between aid intensity and the more policy-relevant
notions of aid effectiveness and aid dependence? Defining aid effectiveness in terms
of the contribution of a dollar of aid to domestic welfare in the recipient country, it is
clear that higher aid levels to a given recipient will at some point encounter
diminishing returns. It follows that if aid intensity were randomly assigned to
countries (e.g., through a purely political process that had no relation to the welfare
impact of aid), high aid intensity would generate a presumption of low marginal aid
effectiveness. But if donors either implicitly or explicitly target aid effectiveness in
allocating aid—as their increasing preoccupation with selectivity suggests in the
1990s—then high aid intensity can be associated as much with a presumption of high15
marginal effectiveness as with low marginal effectiveness. The map between aid
intensity and aid effectiveness therefore cannot be determined without a structural
analysis that controls for country-specific factors as well as allocation behavior by
donors (see, for example, Burnside and Dollar (1997)). Individual case analysis will
also be required to document idiosyncratic determinants of aid effectiveness.
Mapping aid intensity to aid dependence is even more complex given the
various and murky meanings of dependence. Azam, Devarajan and O’Connell (1998)
focus on the interaction between aid and institutional learning-by-doing by the
recipient. Aid fills resource gaps while partly displacing the domestic activity that
would otherwise generate learning. In this analysis, all recipients enjoy short-run gains
from aid and would be hurt by a reduction. This dimension of dependence is the
straightforward counterpart to the “gains from aid” and is present whether aid
intensity is high or low. More importantly dependence in this form is fully consistent
with ultimate graduation by the recipient. But there are multiple dynamic equilibria.
The aid relationship can get stuck at a high-aid, weak-institutions equilibrium in
which institutions remain weak and graduation never occurs. In such cases the
resource intensity of aid begins high and remains high, even though there is an
alternative path in which aid is reduced and a cumulative process of institutional
development takes place. The typical time pattern of aid to African countries over the
last three decades is not inconsistent with the latter, more disturbing type of
dependence. But intensive case analysis, complemented if possible with structural
cross-country econometric analysis, will be required to document institutional learning
processes and their interaction with aid. We remain some distance from being able to
conclude that forces intrinsic to high aid flows—as distinct from country- and donor-
specific influences, broader features of the international aid regime (van de Walle
(1998)), and exogenous shocks—have produced the observed persistence of high aid
to African countries.16
Appendix 1: Data Sources and Definitions
DAC98: OECD Development Assistance Committee, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to
Aid Recipients. Data are taken primarily from the OECD's Creditor Reporting System. The published
version covers 1992-96. We use the 1998 CD-ROM version which gives data from 1960 to 1996. A
drawback of this source is that it does not distinguish between missing values and true zeros; both are
given a value of zero. We used various rules of thumb to convert zeros to missing where this seemed
clearly appropriate.
GDF98: World Bank, Global Development Finance 1998. This is the continuation (since 1997) of the
World Debt Tables. Debt data are taken primarily from the Bank's Debtor Reporting System; data on
official grants are from the DAC. We use the 1998 CD-ROM version which gives data from 1970 to
1997.
WDI98: World Bank, World Development Indicators 1997. This is the continuation of the World
Tables. We use the 1997 CD-ROM version which gives data from 1970 to 1996.
PWT5.6: Penn World Tables, Mark 5.6. Real national accounts data developed by the UN's
International Comparison Project (also known as Heston-Summers data). These data for 1950-92 are
available on the NBER's website at [www.nber.org/pwt56.html].
Aid and Debt Terminology
OECD (Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients)
Grants = Financial transfers for developmental purposes, including donor administrative costs, technical
assistance, and the flow impact of current or past debt cancellation. Grants may be tied but do
not carry any repayment obligation.
Grant Element = GE/L, where L is the face value of a loan and GE is its Grant Equivalent.
Grant Equivalent = L - PV, where L is the face value of a loan and PV is the present value of
contractual repayments using a 10% discount rate.
Net ODA = Grants plus Disbursements minus Repayments of ODA Debt.
ODA Loans = Loans for developmental purposes whose contractual terms imply a Grant Element  of at
least 25 percent.
Technical cooperation grants = “free-standing” technical cooperation, i.e., excluding technical
cooperation tied to the implementation of aid-financed investment projects.
World Bank (Global Development Finance, World Development Indicators)
Aggregate Net Transfers = Net Flows on Debt, excluding short-term and IMF + Grants excluding
Technical Assistance + Net transfers on Non-debt-creating Flows.
Concessional debt = Debt with original grant element, calculated as by DAC, of 25% or greater.
Net Flows on Debt = Disbursements minus Repayments of Debt (includes short-term and IMF).
Net Present Value = Present value of contractual obligations on outstanding debt, using currency-
specific interest rates on OECD export credits to discount future obligations.
Net Transfers on Debt = Net Flows on Debt minus Net Interest Payments on Debt.
Net Transfers on Non-debt-creating Flows = Foreign Direct Investment, Net + Portfolio Equity Flows +
Profit Remittances on FDI.
Grants = DAC Grants excluding Technical Cooperation grants.
NB: For analysis of accounting conventions in the Debtor and Creditor Reporting systems, and the
relationship of debt and balance of payments data, see BIS, IMF, OECD and World Bank (1994).17
Appendix 2: Grant equivalents generalized
An economically appealing way of identifying the resource transfer implicit in any set
of transactions with donors is to ask what pure grant would have produced the same
effect on the recipient’s intertemporal welfare. Such a measure can be approximated
by decomposing the face value of each transaction into an exchange of (discounted)
values at appropriately defined market prices—e.g., a loan with a market-based
repayment schedule, or a cocoa export reimbursed at market prices—and a residual ex
ante grant equivalent. The market-priced component (zero for a pure grant) would,
by definition, not shift the recipient’s intertemporal budget constraint. Only the grant
element would do so, leading to a welfare increase approximated by the amount of the
shift.
The appropriate market interest rate for this calculation is the recipient’s
marginal rate of substitution between present and future foreign exchange. For
countries unable to borrow commercially at the margin, this is likely to be well above
risk-free or even "average risk-adjusted" market rates. Thus even loans that carry no
explicit concessionality—including reschedulings at market interest rates—would
carry a grant element proportional to the difference between the MRS and the actual
interest rate.
The logic of grant equivalents is already used by the DAC in classifying loans
by concessionality, though not in calculating aid amounts. The face value of each
development loan is decomposed into a market-priced component (the present value
of future contractual obligations at the conventional “market” interest rate of 10%)
and a residual grant element. Loans with grant elements exceeding 25 percent of the
face value are classified as concessional. If recipient-specific interest rates were used
in this exercise, the grant element would correspond exactly to our grant equivalent:
only this portion of the transaction would produce a shift the recipient’s intertemporal
budget constraint and thereby qualify as aid. The remainder of the face value would be
moved in equation (2) from net transfer on aid to “net transfer on nonconcessional
debt to official creditors.”
To illustrate the implications for aid measurement, consider a concessional
one-period loan of $100 that carries a repayment obligation of $77 and no interest.
Suppose that the reference interest rate of 10% is indeed equal to the borrower’s MRS.
The discounted value of repayments is then $77/(1 + .1) = $70, implying an ex ante
grant element of 30%. In the DAC data, therefore, we would observe Net ODA of
$100 in the period of the loan, followed by negative Net ODA of $77. Using grant
elements, in contrast, the initial transfer would be recorded as $30 rather than $100.
The subsequent repayment would produce a recorded transfer of zero, which is its own
grant element, relative to the established counterfactual of full repayment.
This approach makes a distinction between ex ante and ex post flows that is
analytically useful in a world of debt restructurings. What is calculated each year is
the ex ante grant element in all current transactions. In the process a revised set of
anticipated future flows—in effect, a new intertemporal budget  constraint for the
subsequent year—is laid out, establishing the counterfactual against which future
transactions will be assessed. Subsequent transactions may of course include ones that
alter the repayment terms on existing loans. The ex ante grant equivalent of such
transactions is the reduction in the present value of borrower obligations, viewed from
the year in which the transaction takes place. To illustrate, suppose that the repayment
of $77 is cancelled by the donor in period 2. Net ODA would therefore be ($100, 0):18
the transaction would produce an imputed grant of $77 and an imputed repayment of
$77 in the second period. Relative to the counterfactual of repayment, however,
cancellation of principal in period 2 is the equivalent of a pure grant. The sequence of
grant elements would therefore be ($30, $77).
The ex post grant equivalent of any sequence of completed transactions with
donors can be defined as the present value of all cash flows associated with these
transactions. Under full repayment (including the possibility of reschedulings at
market terms), the ex ante and ex post grant equivalents are identical. With
restructuring on concessional terms, the ex post grant equivalent exceeds the ex ante
grant equivalent (the present value of ($30,$77) is $100, which exceeds $30). Except
for the fact that Net ODA excludes interest payments, the ex post grant element can be
calculated using either Net ODA flows or the sequence of ex ante grant equivalents.
Thus in our example (in which interest was excluded), $30 is the present value at the
reference interest rates of either (100,-77) or (30,0), and $100 is the present value of
either ($100, 0) or ($30, $77).
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What implications does this ex ante/ex post distinction have for interpreting
changes in Net ODA over the sample period? If we use long time averages, Net ODA
can at least approximate the ex post grant equivalent of any underlying set of debt and
grant transactions (excluding interest). The time-phasing of ex ante transfers within
any long period, however, depends on the measure used. By aggregating loans with
grants, Net ODA “front-loads” the sequence of transfers. If the appropriate
counterfactual is indeed that contractual loans were never going to be repaid, then Net
ODA numbers correspond well to ex ante grant equivalents. In this case the
subsequent restructurings were implicitly anticipated. The original loans were
properly treated as grants; and the restructurings, when they occurred, had zero ex ante
grant equivalents. If the appropriate counterfactual is the contractual obligations,
however, then the DAC treatment tends to underestimate both the growth of ex ante
grant equivalents over time and their level late in the sample.
We close this discussion by making a final observation regarding risk
aversion. If recipients are risk-averse, then even arrangements with zero ex ante grant
equivalents may carry a grant element in the form of insurance. In this paper we
abstract from insurance issues by focusing on long time averages of the data. Such
averages will underestimate or overestimate the true grant element of transactions
with donors, however, according to whether these transactions are reducing or
exacerbating volatility in the recipient's overall foreign exchange receipts.
                                                
25 We are being somewhat cavalier here with respect to the reference interest rates. The ex post grant
equivalents will match under the two approaches (except for interest) only if the same sequence of
implied short-term interest rates is used to calculate ex ante grant equivalents over the full period of the
calculation.19
Table 1: Technical Cooperation in Net ODA
Median values of country averages, in real 1995 U.S. dollars per capita except where otherwise
indicated.
----------+-------------------------------------------------------------
          |                          Technical   Ratio of    Ratio of
Region    |                 ODA     Cooperation  TC Grants   TC Grants
and       |   Net ODA     Grants      Grants     to Grants   to Net ODA
decade    |                                         (%)         (%)
          |     (1)         (2)         (3)         (4)         (5)
----------+-------------------------------------------------------------
38 Sub-Saharan African countries
  1960s   |    15.78       12.93        3.64       37.77       27.08
  1970s   |    36.34       26.08       11.10       50.29       36.01
  1980s   |    44.76       33.00       12.70       42.29       28.89
  1990-96 |    49.90       38.42       11.82       32.24       24.52
----------+-------------------------------------------------------------
58 Other developing countries
  1960s   |    15.84       12.21        2.26       29.15       17.75
  1970s   |    20.03        8.58        4.58       60.57       29.78
  1980s   |    16.49       10.91        5.50       52.25       32.44
  1990-96 |    20.43       14.17        6.78       48.61       34.52
----------+-------------------------------------------------------------
Source: OECD, DAC98 CD-ROM. The table includes all countries with populations exceeding 800,000
in 1990 and with a complete set of observations for more than half of the years in each decade.
Table 2: Net Disbursements, Net Interest, and Net Transfers
Median values of country averages, in real 1995 U.S. dollars per capita.
----------+---------------------------------------------------
          |  ODA Loans    -------- Concessional Loans --------
          |  (DAC data)            (World Bank data)
Region    |
and       |     Net           Net          Net          Net
decade    | Disbursement  Disbursement   Interest     Transfer
          |     (1)           (2)          (3)          (4)
----------+---------------------------------------------------
36 Sub-Saharan African countries
  1970s   |     8.44         11.08         0.80         9.99
  1980s   |    15.14         17.06         1.09        16.01
  1990-96 |    12.87         13.08         1.73        10.40
----------+---------------------------------------------------
44 Other developing countries
  1970s   |     9.41          8.90         1.30         7.30
  1980s   |     8.07          8.96         1.98         7.39
  1990-96 |     5.21          6.74         3.15         3.21
----------+---------------------------------------------------
Sources: Column (1): OECD, DAC98. Columns (2)-(4): World Bank, GDF98. Population and U.S.
GDP deflator are from DAC98. The table includes all countries with populations exceeding 800,000 in
1990 and with a complete set of observations for more than half of the years in each decade.20
Table 3: Aid in Overall Net Transfers
Median values of country averages, in real 1995 U.S. dollars per capita.
Data exclude Technical Cooperation (TC) grants.
----------+-----------------------------------------------------------------
          |    DAC data   ------- (World Bank data) Net Transfer on: -------
Region    |
and       |               Concessional   Official      Total
decade    |     Total       Debt and     Debt and     Debt and       All
          |    Net ODA       Grants       Grants       Grants       Flows
          |      x TC         x TC         x TC         x TC         x TC
          |      (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)          (5)
----------+-----------------------------------------------------------------
38 Sub-Saharan African countries
  1970s   |     23.29        27.00        31.65        36.76        36.98
  1980s   |     34.41        34.93        33.42        32.90        32.73
  1990s   |     38.28        37.08        33.90        32.27        31.75
----------+-----------------------------------------------------------------
44 Other developing countries
  1970s   |     16.13        16.91        18.73        46.08        34.73
  1980s   |     16.32        15.38        20.42        15.60        20.05
  1990s   |     13.36        11.67         4.11         1.33        16.16
----------+-----------------------------------------------------------------
Sources: Column (1): OECD, DAC98. Columns (2)-(5): World Bank, GDF98, with Grants excluding
TC, population, and U.S. GDP deflator taken from DAC90. The table includes all countries with
populations exceeding 800,000 in 1990 and with a complete set of observations for more than half of
the years in each decade.
Definitions: “Net transfer” in columns (2)-(5) is net loan disbursements minus interest payments, for the
indicated category. “Total debt” in column (4) includes not only public and publicly guaranteed debt
held by official or private creditors, but also private nonguaranteed debt. Column (5) corresponds to
what the World Bank calls “Aggregate net transfers”: this is column (4) plus net portfolio investment
and net equity inflows, minus net profit remittances.21
Table 4: Aid Intensity Measures, 1990-95
Regional medians of country averages for 1990-95.
-------------------+------------------------------------------------------------
                   |   ---- Net ODA ----   --- Net ODA excluding TC ---   TC as
Region             |   Real $                      as ratio to:         Ratio to
or                 |     per    Ratio to              Gross     Gov’t     Gov’t
Country            |   Capita      GNP     Imports  Investment Spending    W&S
                   |     (1)       (2)       (3)       (4)       (5)       (6)
-------------------+------------------------------------------------------------
Latin America      |    24.30      1.66      1.70      4.16      3.19     12.62
                   |
HPAE               |     4.10      0.22      0.23      0.57      1.70      5.68
                   |
South Asia         |    15.89      6.96     21.24     31.12     20.49     28.09
                   |
Pacific            |    32.28     11.01     14.09     22.64     23.15     16.62
                   |
Other              |    26.13      1.97      2.64      4.23      5.40      3.80
                   |
Sub-Saharan Africa |    51.59     13.41     28.38     71.37     49.70     37.25
                   |
Full sample:       |
  75-th percentile |    64.56     15.50     29.15     67.61     30.79     35.07
            median |    37.77      6.34      8.49     19.42      7.17     17.92
  25-th percentile |    10.78      0.82      1.70      2.36      1.48      5.97
-------------------+------------------------------------------------------------
Case study countries:
Botswana           |    94.59      3.40      2.64      5.02      5.07     17.95
Burkina Faso       |    47.07     17.65     46.24     53.94       .         .
Cameroon           |    48.11      6.21     18.20     29.09     19.73     21.49
Mali               |    53.21     19.30     37.75     58.61       .         .
Mozambique         |    80.33     97.53     75.61    135.03       .         .
Uganda             |    41.84     20.51     70.06    104.87       .         .
Zambia             |   120.46     32.89     48.80    218.43    123.54    135.21
-------------------+------------------------------------------------------------
percentile ranks:  |
Botswana           |      88        43        30        35        40        53
Burkina Faso       |      62        80        89        68        .         .
Cameroon           |      65        50        62        55        64        57
Mali               |      70        81        83        72        .         .
Mozambique         |      85       100        97        87        .         .
Uganda             |      53        82        95        85        .         .
Zambia             |      93        93        91        96       100        88
-------------------+------------------------------------------------------------
Sample size by variable:
Latin America      |      22        22        21        22        17        17
HPAE               |       8         8         7         7         6         3
South Asia         |       7         6         6         6         5         3
Pacific            |       7         6         7         4         3         3
Other              |      18        16        15        15        12         7
Sub-Saharan Africa |      40        38        37        36        14        12
Full sample        |     102        96        93        90        57        45
-------------------+------------------------------------------------------------
Sources: Columns (1),(2): OECD, DAC98 CD-ROM. Columns (3)-(6): World Bank, WDI98 CD-ROM
for imports, investment and government spending; Net ODA and TC from DAC98. Each column refers
to all countries with populations exceeding 800,000 in 1990 and with observations available for the
relevant variable in three or more years in 1990-95. The samples in columns (1) and (2) are larger than
those in Tables 2-4, because the earlier tables required countries to have data available for all decades;
the full sample for column 1 is given in Table 10.
Definitions: For country composition of full regions, see Table 10. Imports are imports of goods,
services and income. Investment is gross domestic investment. Government spending is total
government expenditure. Gov’t W&S is government wages and salaries.22
Table 5: Aid/GNP Across Regions and Over Time
Regional aggregates are median values of country averages, in percent.
All data except percentile ranks are in ratios to GNP.
----------+------------------------------------------------------------
          |             Net     ||                      Net
          |           Official  ||                     Official
Region    |    Net    Transfer  ||     Net    pctile   Transfer  pctile
and       |    ODA      x TC    ||     ODA     rank     x TC      rank
Decade    |   (DAC)     (WB)    ||    (DAC)   [n=95]    (WB)     [n=75]
          |    (1)      (2)     ||     (3)      (4)      (5)      (6)
----------+---------------------++-------------------------------------
Lat. Am.  |n=    22       22    ||Botswana
  1970s   |    1.31     0.18    ||    18.17      93     18.09      96
  1980s   |    1.38     0.34    ||    11.43      78      7.64      69
  1990s   |    1.58     0.51    ||     3.17      46      0.56      37
----------+---------------------++-------------------------------------
HPAE      |n=     7        3    ||Burkina Faso
  1970s   |    0.74     0.12    ||    13.12      89      9.63      89
  1980s   |    0.15     0.17    ||    13.32      83      9.08      72
  1990s   |    0.02     0.12    ||    17.52      80     11.87      74
----------+-------------------------------------------------------------
So. Asia  |n=     6        5    ||Cameroon
  1970s   |    4.14     1.27    ||     4.70      65      4.07      60
  1980s   |    8.64     3.20    ||     2.55      40      1.81      34
  1990s   |    6.51     1.71    ||     6.02      50      3.42      46
----------+------------------------------------------------------------
Pacific   |n=     5        3    ||Mali
  1970s   |   19.49    10.65    ||    12.88      88     11.61      90
  1980s   |    9.04     3.27    ||    21.88      95     16.51      90
  1990s   |   11.06     6.28    ||    19.32      83     12.10      76
----------+------------------------------------------------------------
Other     |n=    15       10    ||Mozambique
  1970s   |    2.74     2.64    ||     2.17      42       .         .
  1980s   |    2.62     1.29    ||    22.48      96       .         .
  1990s   |    1.75     0.99    ||    92.09     100       .         .
----------+------------------------------------------------------------
SSA       |n=    34       32    ||Uganda
  1970s   |    7.53     3.00    ||     1.31      31      1.02      21
  1980s   |   11.24     4.43    ||     5.98      53      5.27      54
  1990s   |   15.30     8.21    ||    18.94      82     13.47      84
----------+------------------------------------------------------------
All       |n =  89       75     ||Zambia
  1970s   |   3.03     0.73     ||     3.46      55      4.20      61
  1980s   |   5.04     2.38     ||    13.34      84     10.10      77
  1990s   |   6.02     3.52     ||    30.52      92     15.62      86
----------+------------------------------------------------------------
Sources: Columns (1),(3),(4): OECD, DAC98. Columns (2),(5),(6): World Bank, GDF98, with Grants
excluding TC, population, and U.S. GDP deflator taken from DAC90. The table includes all countries
with populations exceeding 800,000 in 1990 and with a complete set of observations for more than half
of the years in each decade.
Definitions: For country composition of regions corresponding to columns 1 and 2, see the columns
labeled “DAC” and “WB” in Table 10. “Net official transfer” is net loan disbursements, minus net
interest payments, plus grants, minus technical cooperation grants, for all official creditors.23
Table 6: Panel Regressions
Dependent Variable: 100*(Net ODA)/GNP.
Columns 1 and 2 use the full sample; column 3 excludes observations from SSA.
_______________________________________________________________________________
(1)  (2) (3)
_______________________________________________________________________________
Constant 10.72      119.73 74.38
(6.78)      (5.85) (3.33)
Period effects:
   1970-74 -6.51  -9.54 -4.65
    (-3.91)     (-6.50) (3.85)
   1975-79 -4.46  -6.32 -2.52
    (-2.49)     (-4.23) (1.95)
   1980-84 -4.34  -5.00    -2.04
    (-2.42)     (-3.48) (1.92)
   1985-89 -2.30 -3.04 -2.06
    (-1.18)     (-2.00) (2.06)
ln(pop-1)   -- 5.06 -2.29
  (-2.13) (1.37)
[ln(pop-1)]
2    --  0.14 0.03
(1.22) (0.36)
ln(rgdpcap-1)  --      -13.96 -8.11
 (-3.26) (1.39)
[ln(rgdpcap-1)]
2   --  0.50 0.23
(1.88) (0.64)
_______________________________________________________________________________
Number of obs.  450 450 261
F for rhs vars   F(4,445)=6.33  F(8,441)=31.51 F(8,252)=15.88
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00
R
2 0.06 0.40 0.36
Root MSE 9.98    7.97    4.78
_______________________________________________________________________________
Notes: Observations are half-decade averages, with the excluded period being 1990-95 (6 years; all
others have 5). Columns 1 and 2 use the full sample; column 3 excludes observations from SSA.
Lagged variables are end-or-period values from the previous halfdecade. Numbers in parentheses are t-
statistics calculated using robust standard errors.24
Table 7: Actual and Predicted ODA/GNP
Averages across available observations.
----------+-----------------------------------------------------------------
          |                ---- Regression ----      ---- Regression ----
Region    |     Actual         including SSA             excluding SSA
or        |    Net ODA/
Country   |      GNP       Predicted    Residual     Predicted    Residual
          |                             = 1 – 2                   = 1 - 4
          |      (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)          (5)
----------+-----------------------------------------------------------------
SSA       |
1970s   76|      7.61         9.90        -2.30         9.49        -1.88
  80s   77|     13.06        12.71         0.34        10.24         2.81
  90s   36|     19.14        16.29         2.85        11.99         7.14
----------+-----------------------------------------------------------------
Other     |
1970s  100|      3.43         1.68         1.74          .            .
  80s  109|      3.43         3.68        -0.24          .            .
  90s   52|      4.89         6.86        -1.97          .            .
----------+-----------------------------------------------------------------
Percentile ranks for case study countries:
Botswana
1970s     |       96           92           +4           90           +6
  80s     |       80           75           +5           72           +8
  90s     |       45           69          -24           67          -22
----------+-----------------------------------------------------------------
Burkina Faso
1970s     |       91           94           -3           94           -3
  80s     |       86           94           -8           94           -8
  90s     |       80           88           -8           88           -8
----------+-----------------------------------------------------------------
Cameroon
1970s     |       66           69           -3           70           -4
  80s     |       39           57          -18           58          -19
  90s     |       51           54           -3           56           -5
----------+-----------------------------------------------------------------
Mali
1970s  70 |       90           93           -3           93           -3
  80s  80 |       94           90           +4           90           +4
  90s  90 |       81           87           -6           87           -6
----------+-----------------------------------------------------------------
Mozambique
1970s     |       28           39          -11           42          -14
  80s     |       84           63          +21           63          +21
  90s     |      100           72          +28           72          +28
----------+-----------------------------------------------------------------
Uganda
1970s     |       32           75          -43           77          -45
  80s     |       54           76          -22           77          -23
  90s     |       82           84           -2           84           -2
----------+-----------------------------------------------------------------
Zambia
1970s     |       52           62          -10           62          -10
  80s     |       80           72           +8           72           +8
  90s     |       93           79          +14           79          +14
----------+-----------------------------------------------------------------
Sources: See Table 6.
Definitions: Column 2 and 4, respectively, give the fitted values from the regressions in columns 2 and
3 of Table 6.25
Table 8: External Debt, 1990-95
Regional medians of country averages for 1990-95 except as noted.
-----------------+--------------------------------------------------------------
                 |  # of    --------- Ratio of: ---------
Region           |  Debt                     Concessional    Grant         Grant
or               |  Restr’  Debt       Arrears    Debt to    Element     Element
Country          |  ings    to           to         Total    in Debt      in New
                 |  1980-   Exports     Debt         Debt    Stock   Commitments
                 |  1997                                               (1994-96)
             #obs|   (1)      (2)        (3)        (4)        (5)        (6)
-----------------+--------------------------------------------------------------
Latin America  22|    6     178.2        7.5       20.7       10.2       20.7
HPAE            4|    0      94.3        0.0       14.5        1.8       26.2
South Asia      6|    0     263.8        0.3       79.7       40.1       59.4
Pacific         7|    2     663.1        2.1       81.7       22.8       38.5
Other          12|    2     213.5        4.3       18.8        9.4       22.2
SSA            36|    5     414.7        9.8       58.2       32.8       59.0
Full sample    87|    3     261.2        5.7       38.9       18.5       37.8
-----------------+--------------------------------------------------------------
Case study countries:
Botswana         |    0      25.5        1.8       39.5       22.7       32.4
Burkina Faso     |    3     247.5        5.0       77.5       47.1       74.1
Cameroon         |    5     356.0       11.3       34.2       14.2       40.6
Mali             |    4     490.0        8.0       91.3       58.2       69.2
Mozambique       |    7    1389.7       19.3       51.4        4.7       74.6
Uganda           |    7    1108.6       10.5       66.2       54.0       71.1
Zambia           |    8     562.0       27.5       40.8       28.6       63.4
-----------------+--------------------------------------------------------------
percentile ranks:
Botswana         |    .       1         32         51         57         43
Burkina Faso     |    .      47         47         81         85         94
Cameroon         |    .      63         68         43         43         55
Mali             |    .      78         60         95         98         86
Mozambique       |    .      95         79         59         13         96
Uganda           |    .      94         65         73         97         89
Zambia           |    .      80         89         52         67         78
-----------------+--------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Column 1: The number of official and commercial debt restructurings is compiled from tables
in GDF98 volume 1 and World Debt Tables 1996, volume 1. Columns 2-4 and 6: World Bank, GDF98
CD-ROM. Column 5: World Bank, GDF98, volume 1. The sample includes all countries with
populations exceeding 800,000 in 1990 and with observations available for all variables in three or
more years in 1990-95. Columns 1 and 6 have 37 rather than 36 African countries, and 88 countries
overall.
Definitions: External debt includes both long-term and short-term debt owed by private or official
borrowers, and includes the stock of arrears. Exports are exports of goods, services, and income.
Arrears include arrears on both interest and principal. Concessional debt is debt with an original grant
element of 25 percent or more. The grant element in the debt stock is calculated as 100*(Debt-
PV)/Debt, where Debt is external debt and PV is the World Bank’s calculation of the present value of
future repayment obligations. The discount rates used in the Bank’s calculation are currency-specific
interest rates on officially supported OECD export credits, which represent “on average, the most
favorable terms of fixed-rate, non-concessional debt developing countries are able to contract in the
international loan market.” (World Bank 1992, p. 127).26
Table 9: External Debt Service, 1990-95
Regional medians (columns 1-3) or means (columns 4-7) of country averages over the indicated
periods.
-----------------+--------------------------------------------------------------
                 |  --- Ratios to exports: ---     Actual disposition of debt
                 |                               service due excluding arrears:
                 |           Debt                          (percent)
Region           |           Service   Total
or               |  Debt     Due       Debt                              Change
Country          |  Service  Excl.     Service           Resch-   Canc-  in
                 |  Paid     Arrears   Due        Paid   eduled   elled  Arrears
             #obs|    (1)      (2)      (3)        (4)     (5)     (6)     (7)
-----------------+--------------------------------------------------------------
Latin America  22|   23.2     27.9     46.7      108.1    54.2     9.7   -71.9
                 |
HPAE            4|   12.2     12.2     12.2      100.0     0.0     0.0    -0.0
                 |
South Asia      6|   14.7     15.8     16.5       97.9     0.0     1.5     0.6
                 |
Pacific         7|   10.2     28.9     28.9       63.9     9.6     2.9    23.5
                 |
Other          12|   14.2     25.7     38.5       74.6     9.6     4.1    11.7
                 |
SSA            36|   19.9     38.0     70.2       57.4    17.0    11.4    14.2
                 |
Full sample    87|   18.4     30.2     43.4       77.9    22.9     8.1    -8.8
-----------------+--------------------------------------------------------------
Case study countries:
Botswana         |    3.8      3.9     4.2        97.8     0.0     0.0     2.2
Burkina Faso     |    9.5     17.8    30.0        67.1    19.0    23.2    -9.3
Cameroon         |   20.0     49.6    84.1        43.7    31.5     6.9    17.9
Mali             |   12.7     40.3    70.3       127.4    41.5    20.0   -88.9
Mozambique       |   28.9    131.0   388.8        23.2    45.9    24.2     6.7
Uganda           |   53.1     78.9   194.1        76.4    17.2     9.0    -2.7
Zambia           |   57.2     77.6   248.9        67.5    28.2    20.2   -16.0
-----------------+--------------------------------------------------------------
percentile ranks:
Botswana         |     2        1       1          74      21      13      57
Burkina Faso     |    24       24      37          43      73       9      16
Cameroon         |    54       80      73          22      85      62      73
Mali             |    35       70      67          96      93      83       3
Mozambique       |    80       94      95           8      96       9      66
Uganda           |    96       89      85          51      71      70      20
Zambia           |    97       88      90          45      82       8      11
-----------------+--------------------------------------------------------------
Sources: World Bank, GDF98 CD-ROM. The sample includes all countries with populations exceeding
800,000 in 1990 and with observations available for all variables in three or more years in 1990-95.
Columns 4-7 are means and sum to 100 percent.
Definitions: Exports are exports of goods, services and income. Debt service due is not reported
directly by the World Bank but can be calculated as the sum of end-of-period arrears on interest and
principal, total debt service paid (including net interest on short-term debt), rescheduling of interest and
principal, and forgiveness of interest and principal. Country-by-country, columns 4-7 sum to 100
percent of debt service due excluding arrears.27
Table 10: Regions and countries
Net ODA from all donors, in real dollars per capita and relative to GNP.
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------
Sample for      |   Real $    ---------- Ratio to GNP (%) -----------   Sample
Table 4,        |     per                                  percentile     for
Column 1        |   Capita                                rank, col.5   Table 5
                |   1990-96   1970-79   1980-89   1990-96   1990-96
   (1)          |     (2)       (3)       (4)       (5)       (6)      (7)   (8)
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------
Latin America
Argentina       |     7.6       0.1       0.1       0.2       12        x     x
Bolivia         |    87.9       4.1       7.9      12.0       68        x     x
Brazil          |     1.3       0.2       0.1       0.0        8        x     x
Chile           |    11.1       0.4       0.1       0.3       19        x     x
Colombia        |     4.8       1.0       0.2       0.3       18        x     x
Costa Rica      |    35.1       1.4       5.0       1.7       34        x     x
Dom. Republic   |    10.0       1.3       2.4       0.9       27        x     x
Ecuador         |    20.7       1.3       1.1       1.7       35        x     x
El Salvador     |    62.6       1.7       7.3       5.0       48        x     x
Guatemala       |    20.9       1.2       1.6       1.9       37        x     x
Guyana          |   141.9       4.6       8.9      33.0       94        x     x
Haiti           |    46.6       5.2       8.2      16.2       77        x     x
Honduras        |    65.3       3.3       6.7      10.6       60        x     x
Jamaica         |    54.6       2.0       7.0       3.8       46        x     x
Mexico          |     3.6       0.1       0.1       0.1       11        x     x
Nicaragua       |   149.8       3.0       7.1      40.5       97        x     x
Panama          |    35.2       1.8       1.1       1.5       32        x     x
Paraguay        |    24.3       2.6       1.5       1.6       33        x     x
Peru            |    20.4       0.8       1.3       1.2       30        x     x
Trin. & Tobago  |    10.2       0.3       0.2       0.3       15        x     x
Uruguay         |    23.6       0.4       0.2       0.6       23        x     x
Venezuela       |     2.2       0.1       0.0       0.1        9        x     x
HPAEs
China           |     2.4       0.0       0.3       0.6       21
Hong Kong       |     3.0       0.0       0.0       0.0        5        x
Indonesia       |     9.1       3.0       1.2       1.2       29        x     x
Korea           |    -0.4       1.7       0.1       0.0        2        x
Malaysia        |     6.5       0.7       0.7       0.3       17        x     x
Singapore       |     4.7       0.6       0.2       0.0        6        x
Taiwan          |     0.3       0.0       0.0       0.0        3        x
Thailand        |    12.9       0.9       1.1       0.6       24        x     x
South Asia
Afghanistan     |    10.2       3.7       0.4
Bangladesh      |    14.2       7.2       8.8       6.5       53
Bhutan          |    99.2       2.9      12.3      25.1       87        x     x
India           |     2.2       1.3       0.9       0.7       25        x
Nepal           |    20.8       3.8       9.9      10.9       62        x     x
Pakistan        |     9.1       4.4       2.9       2.2       41        x     x
Sri Lanka       |    37.0       5.0       8.5       6.5       54        x     x
Pacific
Cambodia        |    33.5      19.7      10.0      12.9       71        x
Laos            |    46.6      24.6       8.1      25.6       89        x     x
Mongolia        |    55.3                 0.2      20.6       84
Myanmar         |     3.0       2.8       4.7       0.3       16
Papua N. Guinea |    91.6      19.5      11.8       9.2       59        x     x
Philippines     |    18.4       1.2       1.5       2.1       40        x     x
Viet Nam        |     7.7       6.3       1.2       4.3       47        x
Other
Albania         |    68.1                          18.2       81
Algeria         |    12.8       1.3       0.3       0.7       26        x     x
Egypt           |    60.9      10.0       5.4       8.6       56        x     x
Iran            |     2.4       0.1       0.0       0.1       10        x
Iraq            |    13.8       0.2       0.1       0.2       13
Israel          |   283.9       3.3       4.5       2.1       39        x
Jordan          |   156.2      26.4      19.5      11.8       67        x     x
Kuwait          |     2.7       0.0       0.0       0.0        4        x
Lebanon         |    47.3       1.8       3.2       2.0       38        x     x
Libya           |     2.4       0.1       0.0
Morocco         |    31.6       2.7       3.6       3.0       42        x     x
Oman            |    27.8       5.9       1.4       0.6       22        x     x
Saudi Arabia    |     2.1       0.0       0.0       0.0        7        x
Syria           |    30.4       7.6       5.6       3.1       44        x     x
Tunisia         |    28.3       5.4       2.6       1.8       36        x     x
Turkey          |    10.4       0.7       0.7       0.5       20        x
UAE             |    -2.3       0.1       0.1       0.0        1        x
Yemen           |    20.4      19.2       9.9       6.1       52        x     x28
Sub-Saharan Africa
Angola          |    35.6       0.5       1.1      13.8       74        x
Benin           |    53.4       8.3       9.3      14.6       75        x     x
Botswana        |    83.6      18.2      11.4       3.2       45        x     x
Burkina Faso    |    43.7      13.1      13.3      17.5       80        x     x
Burundi         |    44.8      10.7      14.2      25.7       90        x     x
Cameroon        |    43.2       4.7       2.6       6.0       51        x     x
CAR             |    57.8      10.9      15.9      16.2       78        x     x
Chad            |    42.4      11.5      17.8      24.0       86        x     x
Congo           |    85.4       7.4       5.0      11.3       64        x     x
Congo (f. Zaire)|     8.9       3.1       4.9       6.7       55
Cote d'Ivoire   |    70.5       2.8       2.5      11.4       66        x     x
Ethiopia        |    19.2       3.6       9.6      16.0       76        x     x
Gabon           |   116.4       1.7       2.2       3.0       43        x     x
Gambia          |    80.9      10.8      39.6      25.7       91        x     x
Ghana           |    40.0       2.8       6.1      10.8       61        x     x
Guinea          |    59.8       1.9       8.2      12.2       70        x     x
Guinea-Bissau   |   126.7      15.6      50.5      59.3       98        x     x
Kenya           |    33.3       4.3       7.5      11.2       63        x     x
Lesotho         |    67.5      10.8      15.1      11.3       65        x     x
Liberia         |    48.0       3.7       9.8
Madagascar      |    28.6       4.6       8.6      12.2       69        x     x
Malawi          |    53.4      10.0      16.8      30.6       93        x     x
Mali            |    50.1      12.9      21.9      19.3       83        x     x
Mauritania      |   116.9      21.8      25.9      25.4       88        x     x
Mauritius       |    37.0       3.6       3.5       1.5       31        x     x
Mozambique      |    73.0       2.2      22.5      92.1      100        x
Namibia         |   105.6       0.0       0.3       5.9       50
Niger           |    40.9       9.4      13.7      16.7       79        x     x
Nigeria         |     2.2       0.5       0.2       0.9       28        x     x
Rwanda          |    73.4      14.1      11.0      40.1       96        x     x
Senegal         |    81.2       7.7      14.1      13.0       72        x     x
Sierra Leone    |    38.6       3.2       7.3      21.7       85        x     x
Somalia         |    52.7      27.7      48.9
South Africa    |     8.0                           0.3       14
Sudan           |    19.8       3.9       9.9       9.0       58
Tanzania        |    38.1       8.2      14.9      34.9       95        x     x
Togo            |    46.8       8.1      12.9      13.4       73        x     x
Uganda          |    38.7       1.3       6.0      18.9       82        x     x
Zambia          |   108.2       3.5      13.3      30.5       92        x     x
Zimbabwe        |    46.6       0.1       4.3       8.7       57        x     x
Memo: large countries excluded from the study:
Armenia         |    44.4                           9.1
Azerbaijan      |    10.4                           2.0
Croatia         |    15.6                           0.4
Georgia         |    29.9                           4.2
Kazakhstan      |     3.6                           0.2
Kyrgyz Republic |    34.7                           6.2
Macedonia       |    34.4                           5.1
Slovenia        |    21.8                           0.3
Tajikistan      |     9.7                           2.6
Turkmenistan    |     4.7                           0.5
Uzbekistan      |     1.8                           0.2
Yugoslavia, FR  |     6.8
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------
Sources: See earlier tables.
Definitions: Data refer to “large” countries only (population of 800,000 or greater in 1990). The sample
in column 1 (excluding those in the “memo” section) constitutes all large countries with at least 3
observations on real aid per capita (using DAC data) for 1990-96. This corresponds to column 1 in
Table 4 (although data may differ because here we average over 1990-96 rather than 1990-95). The
columns labeled  “DAC” and “WB” give the samples used in columns 1 and 2 of Table 5. These
samples are smaller than the full set because we are deflating by GNP and requiring observations to be
available for earlier decades, and (in the WB sample) because we use World Bank debt data rather than
DAC data.29
References
Agénor, Pierre-Richard and Peter Montiel (1996), Development Macroeconomics.
Princeton University Press.
Azam, Jean-Paul, Shantayanan Devarajan, and Stephen A. O’Connell (1998), “Aid
Dependency Reconsidered,” mimeo, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, PA,
USA.
Azam, Jean-Paul and Séraphin M. Fouda (1998), “The economic impact of aid on
recipients,” draft prepared for AERC/ODC Collaborative Research Project on
Managing the Transition from Aid Dependency in Sub-Saharan Africa,
Nairobi, May 21-22.
Bank of International Settlements, International Monetary Fund, Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, and World Bank (1994), Debt
Stocks, Debt Flows and the Balance of Payments. Paris: OECD.
Bräutigam, Deborah and Kwesi Botchwey (1998), “The impact of aid dependence on
governance and institutions in Africa,” preliminary draft prepared for
AERC/ODC Collaborative Research Project on Managing the Transition from
Aid Dependency in Sub-Saharan Africa, Nairobi, May 21-22.
Boone, P. (1994), “Politics and the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid,” mimeo, London
School of Economics, London.
Burnside, C. and D. Dollar (1996), “Aid, Policies, and Growth,” mimeo, The World
Bank, Washington, D.C.
Culagovski, Gabor, Germany and Humphreys (1991), "African external financing in
the 1990s," I. Husain and J. Underwood, eds, African External Finance in the
1990s. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
Devarajan, S., A. S. Rajkumar, and V. Swaroop (1998), “What Does Aid to Africa
Finance?” preliminary draft prepared for AERC/ODC Collaborative Research
Project on Managing the Transition from Aid Dependency in Sub-Saharan
Africa, Nairobi, May 21-22.
Easterly, W. (1997), “The Ghost of Financing Gap: How the Harrod-Domar Growth
Model Still Haunts Development Economics,” Policy Research Working
Paper 1807, August.
Kennan, J. and C. Stevens (1998), “From Lomé to the GSP: Implications for the ACP
of Losing Lomé Trade Preferences,” Institute of Development Studies,
University of Sussex, DSA European Development Policy Study Group
Discussion Paper No. 8, February.30
Osei, B. (1998), “The Cost of Aid-Tying to Ghana,” Work-in-Progress Submitted to
the African Economic Research Consortium, May.
Rodrik, Dani (1996), “Why is There Multilateral Lending?” in Annual World Bank
Conference on Development Economics 1995, Washington, DC: The World
Bank: 167-93.
Summers, Robert and Heston, Alan (1991), "The Penn World Table (Mark 5): An
expanded set of international comparisons, 1950-1988," Quarterly Journal Of
Economics, vol 106, no. 9, May.
van de Walle, Nicolas (1998), “Managing Aid to Africa: The Rise and Decline of the
Structural Adjustment Regime,” preliminary draft prepared for AERC/ODC
Collaborative Research Project on Managing the Transition from Aid
Dependency in Sub-Saharan Africa, Nairobi, May 21-22.
World Bank (1992), World Debt Tables 1992-93, vol. 1: Analysis and Summary
Tables. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
Yeats, A. J. (1990), “Do African Countries Pay More for Imports? Yes” World Bank
Economic Review 4(1), January: 1-20.